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INTRODUCTION

FACTORS INFLUENCING HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATION AND DISPOSAL
Hazardous waste generation is directly proportional to the production of goods and services in most industries, except where it results from episodic events such as spills or the overhauling or shutdown of a production facility. There should, therefore, be a correlation between economic activity and the total volumes of hazardous waste produced. Generator decisions about how to manage hazardous wastes will be influenced by the costs of transportation and management. Some generators manage wastes at their own "captive" treatment, recycling, or disposal facilities (TRDFs). Some corporations ship wastes from multiple manufacturing plants to a single captive TRDF. Wastes managed on-site are not included in the manifest database unless the waste must be transported across a public highway to get from the place of generation to the TRDF.
Transportation costs do not vary greatly by waste type or choice of handling method and have not changed dramatically in recent years. They ranged from $0.08 to 0.17 per ton-mile in 1983, but since 1985 they have ranged from $0.18 to 0.23 per ton-mile . Their importance compared to treatment or disposal costs varies considerably, but it has declined in recent years for some management technologies where management costs have increased at a more rapid rate. For a land disposal shipment traveling a distance of 300 miles in 1983, for example, transportation costs would have accounted for 21-67 percent of the total costs of transportation and disposal; for incineration, the range would have been 25-42 percent for liquid wastes and 3-6 percent for solids or highly toxic wastes. In 1986, transportation costs would have represented 30-43 percent of the costs of shipping wastes 300 miles for land disposal, 10-15 percent for incineration of liquid wastes, and 4-11 percent for incineration of solids or highly toxic wastes.
The direct costs of hazardous waste management are the fees charged by commercial TRDFs or the capital and operating costs of a captive facility. Service fees are negotiated between individual generators and operators of commercial TRDFs. There is, therefore, no set, published fee for a given waste type, handling method, or volume. Large-volume generators who produce wastes of consistent quality, thus necessitating less testing prior to treatment or disposal, may negotiate substantially lower unit-volume rates than smaller generators or those whose waste streams vary in content. Price data are considered strictly proprietary and are not available for individual TRDFs. Annual national surveys of selected commercial TRDFs conducted for the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) [Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 1984; are the only such data in the public domain [Bryant, 1993; Farkas, 1993; MacMillan, 1993] . Respondents to the EPA surveys report a range of prices that are then aggregated to yield a single average range. Estimates from these surveys are presented in Table 1 .
Land disposal is consistently the least expensive management technology, although from 1984 on, the lower end of the recycling price range is less than that for land disposal. Prices for treatment vary dramatically, with the low end representing prices for acids and alkalis and the high end for highly toxic wastes. Incineration costs are lowest for clean liquids and highest for sludges, solids, and highly toxic wastes.
Management service fees will be a function, in part, of the available supply of management capacity. The capacity of a TRDF is a function of several variables, some of which are fixed and others of which are subject to strategic management decisions. Throughput capacity, measured in volume per unit time, is a function of the physical constraints of the waste handling technology. For example, a hazardous waste incinerator will have a combustion chamber that can handle no more than a specified volume of waste per hour, or a land disposal facility will only be able to process so many truckloads per day. Landfills, because they provide the final disposal site for unprocessed wastes as well as the residuals from treatment, incineration, and recycling processes, are also limited by the total volume of permitted land disposal space. TRDF owners may choose to operate a facility at less than its maximum throughput capacity for various reasons. Land disposal owners, especially, may decide to limit the volume of wastes accepted to retain capacity as a hedge against regulatory delays in permitting a new facility' or to conserve space for residuals from other waste management services they might provide [ICF Inc., 1988] . Regulated hazardous waste TRDFs are not required to report operating capacities to state or federal regulatory agencies. Capacity data, therefore, consist only of occasional surveys, such as EPA's annual surveys of selected TRDFs.
EPA's surveys indicate that most commercial facilities do not operate at full capacity. In 1985, for instance, surveyed incineration facilities operated at 85 percent of throughput capacity, chemical and biological treatment facilities at 42 percent, and recycling facilities at 47 percent [ICF Inc., 1988] . Surveyed land disposal facilities were utilizing only 6 percent of permitted landfill space in 1985.
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for out-of-state facilities are not available from the data base used for this study3 or from any national data base [Hearns, 1993] .
The numbers of incineration, recycling, and treatment facilities receiving shipments declined significantly from 1982 to 1983, probably because a number of existing facilities decided to close down rather than comply with design and operational standards that were promulgated by EPA in 1981. Captive facilities handled less than 10 percent of all wastes managed by incineration and land disposal during this period, whereas they accounted for about 25 percent of wastes managed by recycling for 1985 and subsequent years and from 33 to 49 percent of wastes managed by treatment.
Generator choices about hazardous waste management may also be influenced by the perceived legal risks of waste management. Federal courts have held that generators of hazardous waste may be held strictly liable for the 3 The manifest data base records shipments to TRDFs. For in-state facilities, this information is a relatively reliable indicator of the availability of a facility. For out-of-state facilities, this is not necessarily so, since New York generators might decide to stop shipping to an out-of-state facility because of cost rather than capacity. costs of remediating environmental damage from hazardous waste released by accident or from abandoned TRDFs, regardless of the action of other parties, including transporters and TRDF operators [O' Leary, 1989 ]. Generators may also be held jointly and severally liable where damage cannot be apportioned among multiple responsible parties. This means that a single generator may be held liable for all of the costs of remediation.
Concern with liability has motivated some generators to establish their own treatment, recycling, and disposal facilities. Others have purportedly switched commercial TRDFs, opting to use facilities whose design or operations are perceived to be less risky, or have demanded the right to conduct their own inspections of the facilities with which they contract [Deyle, 1985] . Perceived legal risks have also allegedly motivated generators to shift to less risky treatment and disposal technologies and to reduce the volumes of hazardous waste they produce [Deyle, 1990] .
NEW YORK'S HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY INITIATIVES
New York State initiated two major regulatory efforts during the 1980s that were intended, at least in part, to shift hazardous waste management away from land disposal to what were perceived to be less risky technologies. The first was adoption of a state superfund tax, with a rate structure keyed to management technology, that was assessed on the generation and disposal of hazardous waste. The second initiative was a series of restrictions on the land disposal of specific types of hazardous waste. The federal government has no comparable tax on hazardous waste generation and disposal, although such an option has been considered [U.S. Congress, OTA, 1986]. Federal restrictions on land disposal comparable to those adopted by New York went into effect several months or years later.
Both regulatory efforts followed the precepts of what has come to be called the "waste management hierarchy" [National Research Council, 1985], a ranking of waste management technologies by their relative risk to public health and the environment (see Figure 1) . The principal policy objectives have been to limit use of the most risky technologies and to provide incentives to waste generators to use less risky technologies. Sponsors of New York's initiatives also suggested that by increasing the marginal costs of hazardous waste management, these polices might provide economic incentives for manufacturers to reduce the total amounts of hazardous waste they generate. Such initiatives, referred to as source reduction, are considered ideal because they reduce risks to human health and the environment from 
Land Disposal Restrictions
Restricting use of land disposal, which is usually the lowest-cost waste management technology, has been the cornerstone of public initiatives to reduce 
OTHER STATE AND FEDERAL POLICY INTERVENTIONS
In addition to New York's superfund tax and land disposal restrictions, there were several other state and federal policy interventions during the period of this analysis that could be expected to affect the quantities of hazardous waste shipped to off-site facilities for recycling, incineration, treatment, or land disposal. All the relevant state and federal policy interventions during the period of analysis are listed in Table 4 .
New York imposed annual fees on hazardous waste management facilities in 1983 as a means of generating revenues for its environmental regulatory agency. The rate structure varied with the type of facility, allegedly reflecting the agency's administrative costs. Because the fees were not tied to waste volume, their impact on waste management costs would vary with the size of the facility. Table 5 
Preliminary Analysis
Two methods of data smoothing and graphical analysis were employed to identify significant shifts in waste management behavior that were not accounted for by the target policy interventions or other state or federal policies [Deyle and Bretschneider, 1990 ]. This analysis identified several outliers that were determined to be episodic events at individual generating facilities, for example, the closing of a major steel manufacturer in Lackawanna, and the imposition of an enforcement order by the state DEC on another very large generator. The graphical analysis also identified the presence of an annual cycle in the manifest data (see Figure 2) . No satisfactory explanation for the cycle could be provided by contacts at the state DEC or the two major in-state land disposal facilities that operated at that time. Given that the data are weekly, these variations are probably part of the seasonal pattern of manufacturing found in many New York State industries. Other data cleaning included elimination of double counting where wastes are shipped to one facility, stored, recycled, or treated, and then shipped to another facility for further treatment or disposal. Records were also deleted for nonhazardous wastes and disposal of wastes from major cleanups of contaminated sites. 
Model Specification and Analysis
The analytic model was based on the following general model:
y(i, t) = F[I(t), H(t), E(t), C(t), e(t)]
where y(i, t) is the amount of hazardous waste shipped to an off-site facility for management by technology i at time t.
I(t) is a vector of indicator variables associated with relevant policy interventions. H(t) is a vector of variables designed to control for history effects. E(t) is a vector of variables reflecting the level of economic activity during the current week. C(t) is a vector of variables designed to control for available capacity at commercial and captive TRDFs. e(t) is a random error term.
The economic factors, capacity variables, and historical relationship variables are included as statistical controls to obtain more accurate assessments of the intervention effects. No controls were included for liability because of the difficulty of specifying a precise intervention time. The applicability of strict and joint and several liability to hazardous waste management was established through a series of federal court cases rather than through adoption of a statute or promulgation of a regulation. There would have been a considerable and variable lag between decision of the cases and when individual generators became aware of the potential implications to their situation as producers of hazardous waste.
History Effects
One of the complex issues associated with this type of analysis is the numerous policy interventions across time, some of which have contemporaneous effects. In such a situation it is important to account not only for the current effects of a policy intervention, but also for the continuing effects of previous policies (history).
There are numerous alternatives for dealing with history in the context of time series data. Our approach is based on the distributed lag class of models [Judge et al., 1985, pp. 374-386] . Within this group of models, we assume that the dependent variable at time t is the result of the infinite history of one or more key independent variables. In our setting the current level of hazardous waste shipped for management by technology i is a result, in part, of the history of all past shipments of hazardous waste for management by all other technologies. Algebraically, y(i, t) = a + ils p(j, s) x(j, t -s) + e(i, t) i = 1.... 
where P(j) is a parameter of contemporaneous effect for shipments to management technology j not equal to i at time t. 8 is a geometric decay parameter. y(i, t -1) is a one-period lag for the dependent variable. Use of this particular lag structure can be justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Individual hazardous waste generators typically sign long-range contracts with TRDFs. Consequently, week-to-week shipments to a particular facility using a specific waste management technology are a partial adjustment toward target levels derived from these long-term contracts. The most obvious factors related to the partial adjustment process are the current and long-run history of shipments for management by all other technologies. This essentially argues that the model specification provided in While these data should adequately capture the general state and national levels of economic activity, the data are provided in a seasonally adjusted form. Thus additional variables were needed to control the effects of seasonal patterns of manufacturing activity. Toward that end, a set of four seasonal variables based on sine and cosine functions were generated.5 These four variables provide a parsimonious representation for a wide range of possible seasonal patterns. The use of seasonal differencing was rejected since this approach would reduce the sample by at least 20 percent.
Copocity Controls
Each model includes one or two control variables for the number of federally permitted hazardous waste management facilities operating in the state during a given week that provide the waste management technology being modeled. To conserve degrees of freedom, controls were included for only the number of commercial TRDFs in the land disposal and incineration models, because captive facilities handled very small proportions of manifested waste shipments (see Table 2 ). In the treatment and recycling models, separate controls were included for the numbers of commercial and captive TRDFs operating in a given week. Table 4 Table 6 lists how each policy intervention is expected to impact the volumes of hazardous waste shipped for each of the models.
Policy Interventions and the Full Model Each of the interventions listed in
The differential rate structure of the state's superfund tax, which went into effect on September 1, 1982, should have influenced generators' choices of waste management technology to the extent that the tax altered the relative marginal costs of alternative technologies for a given type of hazardous waste. Comparison of the initial tax rates shown in Table 3 with the range of national average treatment and disposal costs shown in Table 1 suggests that little change would be likely. However, the broad, overlapping ranges in prices for all the alternatives to land disposal make predictions difficult. Some changes in management technology may have been stimulated where alternative management costs were fairly similar and alternative facilities had adequate capacity available. This might be the case for low-toxicity wastes in a physical state amenable to alternative management technologies, such as acid or alkaline aqueous wastes.
The impacts of the added cost of the tax on exports should have been similar to those on in-state management because in-state generators were subject to the tax regardless of whether they shipped to in-state or out-ofstate TRDFs. Imports from out-of-state generators for the taxed technologies (all but recycling) would generally be expected to decline. Spurious effects are also possible because this intervention occurred very early in the time series, soon after the manifest system went into effect on June 1, 1982. There may have been increases in manifested shipments during these early months that reflected entry of generators into the regulatory system rather than increases in the actual amounts of hazardous waste being managed.
In 1985 the superfund tax rate was increased for land disposal and treatment. The land disposal tax of $27 per ton represented a 28-percent increase over the midrange of national land disposal prices reported for 1984. The treatment tax of $16 per ton constituted a minor proportional increase for the midrange of national treatment prices in 1984 ($727 per ton), but it would have been considerably more significant for acid and alkali wastes, which had average treatment costs on the order of $14 to $204 per ton. As with the initial tax, some shifts in the use of in-state management technologies and exports may have been stimulated by the increased differences in marginal costs between technologies so long as adequate capacity was available. Imports for land disposal and treatment could be anticipated to decrease, although there could also be a shift from land disposal imports to treatment imports. The state's several initiatives to restrict the land disposal of specific hazardous wastes also should have affected both interstate shipments and the choice of waste management technology. Imports from out-of-state generators for disposal at in-state landfills should have declined as a result of these restrictions. Some of the targeted wastes from out-of-state generators may have continued to enter the state, but they would have been destined for an alternative management technology. In-state generators would be expected to reduce their use of in-state land disposal, but their choice of what alternative to employ would depend on the relative costs of transportation and management fees and the capacity of in-state and out-of-state facilities offering alternative management technologies. For some wastes, it may have been .g., F001 , spent halogenated degreasing solvents; K001, wastewater treatment sludges from wood preserving; K033, wastewater from production of chlordane), irrespective of concentration, collectively accounted for only about 9 percent of all shipments in the state's manifest database.
RESULTS
Tables 7-9 present the results of estimating the 12 regression models. The Portmanteau chi-square test was used to test the adequacy of our models at capturing history effects. Only the models describing imports for recycling and exports and in-state use of treatment demonstrated any problem with serial correlation. For treatment exports and recycling imports, the only individually significant autocorrelation spikes occur at lags 26 and 27 respectively, suggesting that the problem is due to the seasonal pattern. While several autocorrelations are statistically significant for the model of in-state treatment, the pattern again suggests that the problem is confined to the seasonal component of the history effects. A White test for heteroscedasticity was also performed for each model. The results from these tests were again predominantly negative, suggesting that few if any problems of nonconstant error variance were present. In general, the results from these tests suggest that the proposed models adequately control for history.
In the following sections, we discuss the apparent effectiveness of New York's policies in achieving the state's waste management goals and the influence of these policies on interstate movement of hazardous wastes. We also discuss the influence of the selected control variables in the models.
Effectiveness in Attaining State Policy Objectives
Initial imposition of the state superfund tax occurred very early in the time series, at week 13. Its explanatory power in the models is therefore limited. This intervention also occurred only three months after the state's manifest system regulations had gone into effect. Thus, some of the early increases in waste shipments shown in Figure 2 may reflect the entry of generators into the manifest system. The significant increases in treatment shipments in all three models (in-state, exports, and imports) may reflect such behavior. The increase in incineration exports may be a function of increased out-of-state capacity, a phenomenon which could not be modeled effectively with the available data.
The marked change in rate structure that occurred with the tax rate in- deadline Federal recycling definition n/a n/a n/a 29286.00a change Federal burning restrictions n/a n/a -214930.00a n/a No. of commercial landfills -88763.00 n/a n/a n/a No. of commercial incinerators n/a n/a -37998.00a n/a No. of commercial treatment facilities n/a 3255.89 n/a n/a No. of captive treatment facilities n/a 36305.00 n/a n/a No. of commercial recyclers n/a n/a n/a 9030.55a No. of captive recyclers n/a n/a n/a -5468. Table 3 , the tax differential between land disposal and treatment increased from $3 to $11 per ton, and the differential between land disposal and off-site incineration increased from $3 to $16 per ton. Table 7 indicates that the 1985 superfund tax increase was associated with reduced use of land disposal facilities and increased use of treatment facilities in the state by in-state and out-of-state generators. The absence of a significant impact on incineration may reflect the greater difference in marginal cost between land disposal and incineration (see Table 1 ). A shift to increased recycling would also be expected. While the coefficients for the superfund tax increase variable are positive in both the in-state and import recycling models, they are not statistically significant. The lack of significance may be due in part to collinearity with other policy interventions that occurred in 1985, including the changed federal definition of recycling. The primary objective of New York's policies restricting land disposal of certain wastes was to force generators and TRDFs to use lower-risk management technologies. Results shown in Table 7 suggest that these effects were realized to some extent. A decline in the use of in-state land disposal facilities is associated with the second land disposal ban of December 12, 1985, along with increased use of incineration and recycling. While the coefficient for the first ban is negative in the in-state land disposal model, it is not statistically significant. No significant effects associated with the first ban are shown in the in-state models for the other handling methods either. This may reflect the fact that the second ban applied to a larger volume of wastes, because the n/a n/a n/a 110152.00a change Federal burning restrictions n/a n/a 101684.00 n/a No. of commercial landfills -12234.00 n/a n/a n/a No. of commercial incinerators n/a n/a 89673.00a n/a No. of commercial treatment facilities n/a -38447.00 n/a n/a No. of captive treatment facilities n/a 10407.00 n/a n/a No. of commercial recyclers n/a n/a n/a -6260.93 No. of captive recyclers n/a n/a n/a 40000. deadline Federal recycling definition n/a n/a n/a 11041.00 change Federal burning restrictions n/a n/a -191887.00a n/a No. of commercial landfills 35478.00 n/a n/a n/a No. of commercial incinerators n/a n/a -31032.00b n/a
No. of commercial treatment facilities n/a 2787.94 n/a n/a No. of captive treatment facilities n/a -1205.14 n/a n/a No. of commercial recyclers n/a n/a n/a 4434.60a No. of captive recyclers n/a n/a n/a -3079 Table 9 ). While such an increase would not be predicted to result from the policy intervention, it could reflect the closure of out-of-state landfills in anticipation of the November 1985 federal compliance deadline, which is discussed further below. An alternative explanation might be that generators attempted to avoid the concentration thresholds by diluting their wastes (and thereby increasing the total volume). While such practices were explicitly illegal, enforcement would be difficult unless an inspector were present when the dilution occurred at the point of generation. A third alternative is that changes in management of the specific wastes targeted by these regulations are masked by overall patterns in waste management because these wastes constitute such a small percentage of the total volume of hazardous wastes generated.
Analysis 
Impacts on Interstate Shipments of Hazardous Waste
The state superfund tax could be expected to have effects on hazardous waste exports that would be similar to those on the use of in-state TRDFs, because in-state generators have to pay the tax regardless of where they ship their wastes. There may not be any significant changes in exports for less-taxed technologies, however, if in-state generators merely switch to alternative technologies at in-state TRDFs. The absence of significant coefficients for the 1985 tax increase in the treatment, incineration, and recycling models shown in Table 8 is consistent with this latter hypothesis. However, a decrease in exports for land disposal, similar to that in Table 7 , was anticipated.
The 1985 increase in the superfund tax should have made in-state TRDFs less cost-effective for out-of-state generators, especially for land disposal. This hypothesis is supported by the negative coefficient for land disposal in the import model shown in Table 9 .
The effects of New York's land disposal restrictions on imports and exports of hazardous waste were mixed. As shown in Table 8 , the 1984 ban was associated with increased exports for incineration and recycling, while the December 1985 ban was also correlated with increased recycling exports. A similar trend is observed for the December 1985 land disposal ban in the import models: increases in both incineration and recycling. Increases in both imports and exports are possible in reaction to these policies, depending on where generators are located relative to TRDFs offering alternative management technologies. The nearest incinerator for a generator in western New York might be in Ohio, while a Connecticut generator who previously shipped to a New York landfill in Niagara Falls may have decided to ship to a recycling facility just outside of New York City.
There are, however, several unexpected trends. There is no significant decrease in land disposal imports and no increase in land disposal exports associated with any of the three state land disposal bans. In fact, there is a decrease in land disposal exports associated with the 1984 land ban. Again, this may reflect the small fraction of wastes managed by land disposal covered by these restrictions. The occurrence of significant changes in the other handling methods may be due to the smaller volumes of wastes managed using these technologies. Incineration accounted for 13 percent of all waste manifested over the period of analysis, and recycling accounted for only 4 percent. During this time, 52 percent of all wastes were shipped to land disposal facilities and 31 percent were shipped for treatment. Small shifts from land disposal to incineration or recycling may not have been statistically significant in the land disposal models, while they did have a measurable impact in the incineration and recycling models.
There was a significant decrease in exports for recycling associated with the March 1985 land disposal ban, which is counter to expectations (see Table 8 ). The recycling effect may reflect a short-term readjustment after the initial effects of the amended federal definition of recycling in January 1985. This policy intervention was correlated with increases in both recycling exports and in the use of in-state recycling facilities (see Tables 7 and 8) . However, an analysis of individual generators [Deyle and Bretschneider, 1990] revealed that some manifested only a few shipments following this regulatory change. The March 1985 land disposal ban may have coincided with a return to more typical recycling levels once generators had altered recycling practices so that they were again not subject to federal hazardous waste regulations.
A decrease in treatment exports associated with the December 1985 ban was also contrary to expected behavior (see Table 8 ). This may reflect changes in available out-of-state treatment capacity or an overall reduction in waste generation (source reduction). The total volumes of manifested hazardous waste shipped into, out of, and within New York declined by 21 percent between 1985 and 1986. While the annual totals are not corrected for changes in economic activity, economic controls are included in the regression models.
The Effect of Control Variables in the Waste Management Models
Control variables were included in the models for other state and federal policy interventions anticipated to affect decisions about where and how to manage hazardous wastes, as well as controls for economic conditions, the apparent seasonal cycle of the data, in-state TRDF capacity, coterminous use of the other waste management technologies, plus a lagged measure of the dependent variable to reflect history effects of all past shipments to alternative disposal technologies.
The economic control was operationalized as quarterly state or federal employment in the manufacturing sector. Tables 7-9 show that the regression coefficient for this variable was statistically significant in 6 of the 12 models analyzed. In five of these cases, there was a positive correlation between manufacturing employment levels and the amount of hazardous waste shipped. This is consistent with the hypothesis that hazardous waste generation is directly related to production levels.
In the in-state land disposal model, however, the coefficient for the state employment variable was negative. This implies that despite the fact that production levels increased, the amounts of hazardous waste shipped to land disposal facilities decreased. This may reflect a combination of shifts to other waste management technologies or, more likely, source reduction by generators who had used land disposal. The annual totals reported in Table 10 show substantial decreases in land disposal at in-state TRDFs between 1985 and 1986. While there are parallel increases in incineration and recycling, these are not sufficient to account for the changes. These decreases are also not balanced by net changes in imports and exports, as shown in Tables 11 and  12 . Generators may, therefore, have chosen to reduce the volumes of waste they produce in response to the aggregate impacts of policies and factors influencing the costs of hazardous waste management at that time.
Imposition of the state program fees in April 1983 was not expected to have a significant impact on waste management decisions because of the relatively low levels of the fees (see Table 5 ) and the fact that the fees are not linked to waste volumes managed. Tables 8 and 9 show significant decreases in incineration imports and increases in incineration exports, which suggest that the fees may have prompted some changes in behavior (waste incineration facilities were assessed an annual fee of $5000). However, the associated decreases in recycling imports and exports and the increase in land disposal imports are contrary to what would be expected if the fees had resulted in substantial marginal increases in land disposal costs.
The subsequent fee increases in April 1985 had no significant impact except on the use of in-state land disposal facilities. Tables 7 and 9 show significant decreases in shipments to instate land disposal facilities and in land disposal imports following the doubling of the fee for commercial landfills. The apparent effects of the May 1985 federal ban on land disposal of liquid wastes support the hypothesis that generators would resort to methods to stabilize or solidify their wastes rather than shifting to alternative management technologies. Use of in-state land disposal facilities and land disposal imports both increased significantly in association with this policy intervention.
The November 1985 federal compliance deadline for land disposal facilities is not associated with decreased use of in-state land disposal facilities (see Table 7 ). This is supported by Table 2 , which shows no dramatic changes in the numbers of land disposal facilities in the state during 1985 and 1986. Increased treatment and recycling imports shown in Table 9 , and a parallel increase in use of in-state recycling facilities shown in Table 7 , may reflect the impacts of landfill closures in other states.
As previously noted, the January 1985 change in the federal regulatory definition of recycling is significant in the in-state and export recycling models. The coefficient is positive but nonsignificant in the import model. This response was anticipated because the regulatory change expanded the circumstances under which wastes destined for recycling were required to be reported through the manifest system. The December 1985 federal restrictions on burning hazardous waste and waste oils for energy recovery also had the predicted effect. The coefficient for this intervention was negative and significant in two of the three incineration models (Tables 7 and 9) .
DISCUSSION
This analysis provides evidence that New York State was successful in influencing hazardous waste generators to use less risky technologies for manag- ing their hazardous wastes, and indirect evidence that the state's policies may have also prompted generators to reduce the total amounts of waste they produced. However, the evidence also indicates that this success may have altered the allocation of environmental risks between New York and other states. The state's superfund tax, with its rate structure based on waste management technology, appears to have influenced some generators to switch from land disposal to treatment, a lower-risk technology. There is also evidence that New York's initiatives restricting the disposal of certain types of hazardous wastes at in-state landfills had the intended effect: reduced reliance on land disposal and increased use of alternative management technologies. The impacts of the land disposal bans on aggregate use of landfills are not strong or consistent, which may reflect the relatively minor proportion of wastes covered by the restrictions. The impacts of these interventions are more apparent on use of alternative management technologies, which may reflect their greater sensitivity to small changes in behavior.
The 1985 increases in the state's superfund tax and its program fees both appear to have discouraged imports to in-state landfills. Wastes that might previously have been shipped into New York may have been diverted to less costly landfills in other states, thus shifting the risks of land disposal to those states. New York's restrictions on land disposal did not result in a significant increase in exports to out-of-state landfills, but did increase waste shipments to other states for management by alternative technologies. Increased exports for incineration and recycling following the land disposal bans may have represented a net shift of wastes from New York to other states. There is evidence that the shift in response to the 1984 land disposal ban may have been compensated by a decrease in land disposal exports (see Table 8 ), but this was not the case following the December 1985 ban. Overall, there was a 7-percent net increase in exports to other states between 1985 and 1986 (see Table 12 ).
There is also indirect evidence of source reduction occurring coincident with several of the state's interventions. Between 1985 and 1986, there was a 32-percent decrease in waste management at in-state TRDFs, which was primarily the result of reduced use of land disposal and treatment facilities. These decreases were not fully balanced by either increased exports or shifts to other handling methods (see Tables 10 and 12 ). The inverse relationship between the state economic control variable and the volume of wastes shipped to in-state land disposal facilities may also be indicative of a source reduction trend. New York's policy initiatives to alter generators' waste management decisions appear, therefore, to have been largely successful. These findings should be tempered, however, by recognition that data available in the public domain limit the potential to fully specify models of hazardous waste management transactions. Prices for hazardous waste management services are negotiated between generators and the operators of commercial TRDFs, and data on facility capacity are not reported on a regular basis by TRDFs. The capacity controls included in the models analyzed here are limited to measures of the numbers of permitted facilities at a given point in time.
In the absence of uniform federal policies, imposition by several other states of taxes and constraints similar to those of New York would tend to shift some of the costs of higher-risk waste management to those states that do not take similar initiatives. In the case of the landfill bans, subsequent implementation of federal land disposal restrictions pursuant to the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) should have produced a more consistent regulatory environment. However, RCRA, as amended by HSWA, still permits states to impose regulations more stringent than those promulgated by EPA. While states have been preempted from imposing taxes analogous to the federal superfund tax, which is assessed on certain raw materials used by the petrochemical industry, states have been free to tax waste disposal so long as taxes do not discriminate against wastes generated out of state.
States, therefore, remain free to set additional restrictions on land disposal of specified wastes as well as to impose other costs that alter the marginal costs of alternative methods of hazardous waste management. These can alter the flow of hazardous waste among the states, shifting the risks associated with such facilities to those states with less stringent regulation or taxation. The New York policy initiatives demonstrate that the spillovers from variation in state environmental regulatory policies are not limited to those resulting from "underregulation." In certain environmental policy areas, such as toxic and hazardous waste management, where public concerns with environmental and public health effects have overridden concerns with raising the costs of producing goods and services, states may have an incentive to regulate and raise the costs of hazardous waste generation and management more so than their neighbors. Federal preemption could eliminate such spillovers, but at the cost of curtailing experimentation and innovation.
